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STATEMENT 05 THE CASE 
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him and rolled over the top of him. He sustained a crushed 
pelvis, denervated perineam, resulting in a patulous and 
uncontrolled anal sphincter. This necessitated a left colostomy. 
His residual injuries consist of total urinary incontinence, 
total neurological impotence and retrograde ejaculation, a 
partial sciatic nerve injury and deformities resulting from the 
pelvic fracture. (Findings of Fact number 1.) 
The Insurance Company of North America/AETNA (hereinafter 
"the insurance carrier11) is the worker's compensation carrier for 
the employer. The insurance carrier paid all medical bills 
arising out of the accident. It also paid temporary total 
disability compensation commencing with the date of the accident 
and continuing until January 16, 1984. 
The plaintiff has been under the treatment of several 
physicians since the date of the accident, including a Dr. 
Douglas Schow. A medical report from Dr. Schow dated December 5, 
1983 indicated that the plaintiff's combined injuries resulted in 
a 79% permanent partial disability rating. (Findings of Fact 
number 2.) 
On January 16, 1984, the insurance carrier, on its own, 
assumed that the plaintiff had become permanently and totally 
disabled and began paying the applicant permanent total 
disability benefits on a weekly basis at the rate of $196.00 per 
week, which represented 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the plaintiff's injury. (Findings of Fact number 4.) 
The insurance carrier paid disability benefits from January 
16, 1984 through and including March 10, 1986, at the rate of 
9 
$196*00 per week. The total paid by the insurer to the plaintiff 
for his injury for combined temporary total impairment, total 
permanent impairment and permanent partial impairment is 
$61,152.00. The insurance carrier and the employer have denied 
further liability for the accident in question. (Findings of 
Fact number 5.) 
The plaintiff was off work from the date of the injury 
through and induing May 15, 1985. On May 15, 1985, the 
plaintiff became employed and has been continuously employed from 
that date. (Findings of Fact number 3.) The plaintiff was 
temporarily totally disabled from October 9, 1980 until May 15, 
1985. Since May 15, 1985, the applicant has suffered a permanent 
partial disability of 79% of the whole man. 
The administrative law judge below required the insurance 
carrier to pay the plaintiff compensation at the rate of $196.00 
per week until such time as it had paid a total of $61,152.00 
representing 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the plaintiff's injury, payable over a period of 312 weeks. 
Further, the administrative law judge ordered the employer and 
the insurance carrier to pay all medical expenses incurred as a 
result of the accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance 
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial 
Commission. 
The plaintiff filed a timely motion for review with the 
Industrial Commission on December 31, 1985, and that motion for 
review was denied by the board of review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on January 21, 1986. From that denial of 
plaintiff's motion for review, the applicant has filed a timely 
appeal to this court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff alleges that the Commission has erred as 
follows: first, that the Industrial Commission has erred in 
tailing to allow him benefits and compensation for one 312-week 
maximum period of temporary total disability and for another 
312-week maximum period of permanent partial disability; and, 
second, that the Industrial Commission has failed as a matter of 
law to calculate accurately the amount of benefits to which the 
plaintiff is entitled. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-65 (1953, as amended) 
provides that a person entitled to worker's compensation benefits 
may receive benefits for temporary total disability up to a 
maximum of 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight 
years from the date of the injury. In addition, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1953, as amended) provides that a 
person entitled to receive worker's compensation benefits may 
receive permanent partial disability benefits not exceeding in 
any case 312 weeks. These statutes should be construed such that 
the plaintiff in this case is entitled to receive benefits for 
temporary total disability benefits up to a maximum of 312 weeks 
at the state average weekly wage at the time of the accident and, 
in addition, is entitled to receive permanent partial disability 
benefits up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage for a period of 312 weeks. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The plaintiff accepts the Findings of Fact as enunciated by 
the administrative law judge. Since the Commission did not enter 
its own Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it must be 
assumed that the Commission has adopted the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law of the administrative law judge. Giles v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 692 P.2d 743, 745 (Utah 1984). 
The employer and the insurance carrier have not appealed the 
decision of the Commission and, therefore, it should be assumed 
that they also accept the Findings of Fact of the administrative 
law judge, as adopted by the Commission. 
Hence, there is no factual issue before this Court. The 
only issue before this Court is an issue of law, namely the 
interpretation of apparently conflicting statutes, and/or an 
award of benefits as authorized by law based upon the facts as 
found by the administrative law judge and adopted by the 
Commission. 
Since this Court is reviewing a question of law, the 
decision of the Commission below is entitled to no deference 
whatsoever in this Court. Board of Education of Alpine v. Olsen, 
684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
692 P.2d 743 (Utah 1984). The court in Olsen stated: 
In reviewing interpretations of general law, . . . we 
apply a correction-of-error standard with no deference 
to the expertise of the Commission. (At page 51.) 
The Court is wholly free to consider the issues now raised 
on appeal by the plaintiff and is wholly free to correct any 
error it may find in the decision of the Conmiission. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO 
RECEIVE BENEFITS UP TO A MAXIMUM OF 312 WEEKS AT 
100% OF THE STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE AT THE TIME 
OF HIS ACCIDENT AND, IN ADDITION, IS ENTITLED TO 
RECEIVE BENEFITS FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY 
AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF COMPENSATION UP TO A 
MAXIMUM OF 312 WEEKS, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-65 (1953, as amended) 
reads as follows: 
35-1-65. TEMPORARY DISABILITY—AMOUNT OF 
PAYMENTS--STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE DEFINED. (1) In 
case of temporary disability, the employee shall 
receive 66-2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages 
at the time of the injury so long as such disability is 
total, but not more than a maximum of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for 
a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such 
dependent children, not to exceed the average weekly 
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not 
to exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury. In no case shall such compensation 
benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
over a period of eight years from the date of the 
injury. (Emphasis added.) 
In addition, Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1953, as 
amended), in pertinent part, states as follows: 
The commission may make a permanent partial disability 
award at any time prior to eight years after the date 
of injury to an employee whose physical condition 
resulting from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of injury and who 
files an application for such purpose prior to the 
expiration of such eight-year period. 
In the case of the following injuries the 
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of that employee's 
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average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not 
more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45.00 per week plus .$5.00 for a 
dependent spouse and $5.00 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such 
dependent children, but not to exceed 66-2/3% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per 
week, to be paid weekly for the number of weeks stated 
for such injuries respectively, and shall be in 
addition to the compensation provided for temporary 
total disability and temporary partial 
disability, '. T\ I 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily 
function not otherwise provided for herein, such period 
of compensation as the commission shall deem equitable 
and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for 
specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this 
section but not exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which 
shall be considered the period of compensation for 
permanent total loss of bodily function. 
The amounts specified in this section are all 
subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no 
event shall more than a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a 
total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be 
paid. (Emphasis added.) 
The above-cited statutory provisions make clear that an 
injured employee entitled to receive worker's compensation 
benefits is entitled to receive both of the following: 
(1) temporary total disability benefits not to exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the 
injury; and, (2) permanent partial disability benefits up to a 
maximum of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury for a total of 312 weeks. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1953, as amended) is 
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in direct contradiction with the provisions of Sections 35-1-65 
and 35-1-66 • The last paragraph of Section 35-1-67 reads as 
follows: 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier 
be required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind as provided in Sections 
35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of 
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
The Commission, in reliance upon the quoted portion of 
Section 35-1-67, ruled that the employer and the insurance 
carrier herein are obligated to pay to plaintiff only 85% of the 
state average weekly wage for 312 weeks, and denied the 
plaintiff's claim for additional benefits. This decision of the 
Commission was improper as a matter of law, and the conflict 
between the provisions of Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 on the one 
hand and Section 35-1-67 on the other should be resolved in favor 
of allowing the plaintiff all the benefits guaranteed to him 
under Sections 35-1-65 and 35-1-66. 
To resolve the apparent contradiction between the statutory 
provisions of 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and 35-1-67, it is necessary to 
turn to the rules promulgated by this Court in interpreting 
statutes and resolving apparent contradictions between statutes. 
One principle enunciated by this Court in resolving 
contradictions between statutory provisions can be found in the 
case of Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985). The Madsen 
decision stated: 
[I]n cases of apparent conflict between provisions of 
the same statute, it is the Court's duty to harmonize 
and reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court 
cannot presume that the legislature intended to create 
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a conflict. Where contradictory provisions are passed, 
the provision susceptible of but one meaning will 
control those susceptible of two if the statute can 
thereby be rendered harmonious. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes, 
Sections 254 and 255 (1974). 
In the instant case, as in the Madsen case, we are 
confronted with an apparent conflict between provisions of the 
same statute. Unfortunately, however, unlike the Madsen 
situation, all statutory provisions in issue here are susceptible 
of but one meaning. Section 35-1-65 is susceptible only of the 
meaning that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits up to a maximum of 100% of the state average 
weekly wage for 312 weeks. Section 35-1-66 is susceptible only 
of one meaning, that the plaintiff is entitled to receive 
permanent partial disability benefits for any permanent partial 
disability he may suffer up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage for 312 weeks. Section 35-1-67 is 
susceptible of only one meaning, that the insurance carrier and 
employer are obligated for a combination of temporary total 
disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits and 
permanent total disability benefits up to a maximum total of 85% 
the state average weekly wage for a period of 312 weeks. 
Another rule of statutory construction adopted by this Court 
is that specific statutory provisions prevail over more general 
expressions. Osuala v. AETNA Life and Casualty, 608 P.2d 242 
(Utah 1980). In the case now before the Court, the more specific 
provisions are the provisions which would grant the plaintiff the 
relief he is seeking. Section 35-1-65 is very specific that the 
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plaintiff is entitled to receive benefits up to a maximum of 100% 
of the state average weekly wrage for 312 weeks for his temporary 
total disability. Section 35-1-66 is very specific that the 
plaintiff is entitled to receive benefits for his permanent 
partial disability up to a maximum of 66-2/3% of the state 
average weekly wage for a period of 312 weeks. The contradictory 
provision contained in Section 35-1-67 is a more general 
statutory expression which attempts to limit on a broader scope 
the provisions of a number of more specific statutes. Pursuant 
to the Osuala decision, the specific provisions of Sections 
35-1-65 and 35-1-66 should govern over the more general statute, 
Section 35-1-67. 
Further, Section 35-1-67 is a provision dealing solely with 
permanent total disability benefits. The portion of the statute 
relied on below to deny the plaintiff the relief sought is the 
last paragraph of the section of the Utah Code establishing 
permanent total disability benefits. That last paragraph should, 
therefore, be read narrowly to apply only in cases of permanent 
total disability. Since the plaintiff is not permanently and 
totally disabled, Section 35-1-67 would not apply here. 
The most important principle enunciated by this Court in 
construing statutes is that the Court will look to the broader 
reason and purpose of the legislation to determine how conflicts 
should be resolved. In the case of Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 
1979), this Court stated: 
One of the cardinal principles of statutory 
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construction is that the courts will look to the 
reason, spirit and sense of the legislation, as 
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of 
the statute dealing with the subject. (At page 783.) 
The Qsuala court, supra, stated: 
There are some cardinal rules of statutory construction 
to be considered in relation to this controversy. If 
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of the provisions of an act, it is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in the 
light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions 
in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. 
It is proper for the Court to consider the broad general 
legislative purpose and intent in adopting the workerfs 
compensation statutes in order to resolve the statutory conflict 
now in issue. The clear purpose of the worker's compensation 
statutes in the State of Utah can be found in Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-45, which provides that every employee 
who is injured and the dependents of every such employee who is 
killed by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment shall be entitled to receive compensation for the 
loss. The purpose of the worker's compensation act was set forth 
in the case of Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 197 P.2d 
487 (Utah 1948). The court there held that the intention of the 
worker's compensation act was to secure workers and their 
dependents against becoming objects of charity, by making 
reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to employment, 
and to make human wastage in industry part of the cost of 
production for the employers and their insurance carriers. 
In the present case, the Court should resolve the statutory 
conflict in question in favor of furthering the broad remedial 
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purposes of the worker's compensation act and the purpose of 
providing reasonable compensation for calamities incidental to 
employment. This Court should resolve the statutory conflict by 
finding that the plaintiff herein is entitled to receive 
temporary total disability benefits for the period of his 
temporary total disability, October 9, 1980 through May 15, 1985, 
at 100% the state average weekly wage at the time of his injury. 
This award would be pursuant to Section 35-1-65. In addition, 
this Court should find that the plaintiff is entitled to receive 
compensation for his permanent partial disability as authorized 
by Section 35-1-66, at 66-2/3% the state average weekly wage at 
the time of his accident, payable for 79% of the 312 week 
maximum. (This is based on the plaintiff's 79% permanent partial 
disability rating.) 
Such an interpretation would promote the purposes of the 
worker's compensation statutes in two respects. First, it would 
award the plaintiff a more appropriate level of compensation for 
the horrible and debilitating injuries which he has suffered. It 
would award the plaintiff the "reasonable compensation11 
contemplated in Section 35-1-45. Second, it should be noted that 
the maximum award level set forth in Section 35-1-67 (85% of the 
state average weekly wage for a maximum of 312 weeks) assumes 
that those individuals who have been 100% disabled such that they 
are entitled to the maximum level of benefits will, at the 
conclusion of the 312-week period of compensation be entitled to 
receive lifelong benefits from the Second Injury Fund. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-67, 68 and 69 (1953, as amended). In the 
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case now at bar, the plaintiff has sustained injuries which are 
permanently and grossly debilitating, but, because of his 
re-employment on May 15, 1985, he cannot be said to be 
permanently and totally disabled. It would be a serious 
injustice and in contradiction to the broad remedial purposes of 
the worker's compensation laws to grant him only compensation at 
85% the state average weekly wage for a maximum of 312 weeks, 
since this level of compensation is based on the erroneous 
assumption that he will have lifelong financial assistance from 
the Second Injury Fund. 
The Court should order that the plaintiff is entitled to 
receive benefits as follows: 
(1) temporary total disability benefits for 
October 9, 1980 through May 15, 1985 (239.15 
weeks) at the state average weekly wage 
effective October 9, 1980 ($230.00) $55,004.50 
(2) permanent partial disability benefits of 79% 
of the 312 week maximum (246.48) at the rate 
of 66-2/3% of the state average weekly wage 
on October 9, 1980 ($153.00) $37,711.44 
TOTAL BENEFITS DUE TO PLAINTIFF $92,715.94 
AMOUNT PAID TO PLAINTIFF TO DATE $61,152.00 
BALANCE DUE TO PLAINTIFF $31,563.94 
The balance due the plaintiff should be made payable to the 
plaintiff at the appropriate weekly rate of $153.00 per week. He 
should be granted a lump sum for arrearages accrued from March 
10, 1986 (the date the insurance carrier last paid weekly 
benefits) through the present, and the balance should be payable 
at the weekly rate. 
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POINT III 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The plaintiff is entitled to the costs of this appeal and to 
receive an appropriate award of attorney's fees herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this Court award him additional worker's 
compensation benefits as set forth in Point of Argument II. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of May, 1986. 
CORPORQN •&), WLLLIAMS 
15/C. CORPOR 
Attorney for Jfl 
Applican 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000816 
KENNETH JOHNSON, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
HARSCO/HECKETT and INSURANCE COMPANY OF * 
NORTH AMERICA/AETNA, * 
* 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPEARANCES: The Applicant is represented by Mary C. Corporon, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant is represented by Robert J. Shaughnessy, 
Attorney at Law and Colleen Richardson. 
A Hearing was deemed unnecessary in this matter, there being no 
factual dispute. The legal issues were submitted for decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Applicant filed a claim with the Commission on September 19, 
1985 alleging that he had sustained an injury by accident arising out of or in 
the course of his employment with Harsco/Heckett on the 9th day of October, 
1980 at Provo, Utah. He alleged the accident occurred when a truck rolled 
backwards on a hill above him and accidentally rolled over him. He sustained 
9 r_r*«*c"hekrt nelvi?, den<?rvated periream resulting in a patulous and uncontrolled 
anal sphincter. This necessitated a left colostomy. His residual injuries 
consist of total urinary incontinence, total neurological impotence and 
retrograde ejaculation, a partial sciatic nerve injury and deformities 
resulting from the pelvic fracture. 
2. The Applicant has been under the treatment of several 
physicians. A letter from Dr. Douglas Schow dated December 5, 1983 indicates 
the Applicant's combined injuries have resulted in a 79% permanent partial 
impairment. 
3. The Applicant was off work from the date of injury to May 15, 
1985. Temporary total disability benefits were paid until January 16, 1984 at 
the rate of $230.00 per week for a total of $39,198.57. 
4. On January 16, 1984, the insurance carrier began paying Mr. 
Johnson permanent total benefits on a weekly basis at the rate of $196.00 and 
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have continued to make payments on this basis. The payments were made at the 
permanent total disability rate on the assumption the Applicant would be 
permanently and totally disabled but in fact he is not. To his credit, the 
Applicant has returned to work and under these circumstances the statute 
mandates that he be paid permanent partial disability benefits subject to the 
limitations set forth in Section 35-1-67 U.C.A. The last paragraph of that 
Section provides 
"In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities 
of any kind as provided in Section 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this 
Section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks". 
Eighty Five percent of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the Applicant's injury was $196.00. The Administrative Law Judge finds that 
the foregoing Section provides a maximum liability on the part of the employer 
of $61,152.00. Counsel for the Applicant challenges this Finding and the 
Conclusion of Law based thereon and contends that the Applicant is entitled to 
temporary total disability compensation for the full period of time and, in 
addition thereto, to the full compensation that would otherwise be due him on 
the basis of the 79% permanent partial impairment rating. 
In addition to the foregoing limitation, the third paragraph of 
Section 35-1-66 provides that 
"In case the partial disability begins after a period of total 
disability, the period of total disability shall be deducted 
from the total period of compensation." 
5. The insurance carrier has acknowledged its liability for payment 
of the statutory maximum of $61,152.00. 
6. The Applicant's injuries are sufficiently significant that he may 
at some point in time prior to normal retirement years become permanently and 
totally disabled. Should such occur, there is no specific period of time 
during which the Applicant can file his petition for permanent total 
disability benefits, for nowt he is limited to the maximum benefits provided 
under Section 35-1-67. The insurance carrier will continue to make payments 
to the Applicant until such time as the total sum of $61,152.00 has been paid 
out. There remains to be paid the approximate sum of $2500.00. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Applicant is entitled to Worker*s Compensation benefits as a 
result of his industrial accident of October 9, 1980 in accordance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendants, Harsco/Heckett and/or 
INA/Aetna pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $196.00 per week until 
such time as it has paid the total sum of $61,152.00 representing 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the Applicant's injury payable over a 
period of 312 weeks. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion' 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
_yj§^day of December, 1985. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on December / H 1985, a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in the case of Kenneth Johnson 
issued December M , 1985, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Kenneth Johnson, 1709 West 120 South, Provo, UT 84601 
Harsco/Heckett, P.O. Box 5, Provo, UT 84601 
Colleen Richardson, INA/Aetna, 455 East South Temple, SLC. UT 84110 
Mary C. Corporon, Atty., 1100 Boston Bldg., 9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 South, #3, SLC, UT 84102 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By _ ^ ^ 2 & ^ 
Carol Olson 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Applicant 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
1100 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000816 
KENNETH JOHNSON/ 
Applicant/ 
-vs-
HARSCO/HECKETT and INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA/AETNA, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
APPLICANT TO THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION, by and through his counsel of 
record/ Mary C. Corporon, hereby requests that the decision before the 
Industrial Commission of Utah in the above-referenced matter entered on or 
about December 18/ 1985/ be reviewed. In support of this Motion for 
Review/ applicant specifies the following particular errors and objections 
to the court's Findings, Conclusions and Order of December 18, 1985; 
In its Order of December 18, 1985, the Industrial Commission of the 
State of Utah has determined that applicant is entitled to receive 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the applicant's injury/ 
payable over a period of 312 weeks. Applicant asserts that he is entitled 
to receive benefits up to a maximum of two 312 week periods of disability, 
the first being for a period of temporary total disability, and the second 
being for a period of permanent partial disability. 
Applicant does not dispute the Findings of Fact: entered on December 
18, 1985. 
Utah Code Annotated/Section 35-1-65 (1981/ as amended) provides that 
injured workers may receive compensation for temporary disability so long 
as such disability is total. The first paragraph of subsection (1) of 
this statute states: "In no case shall such compensation benefits exceed 
312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury." 
(emphasis added) 
Further/ Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-1-66 (1983 as amended) 
provides that injured workers may receive compensation for permanent 
partial disability. The tenth full paragraph of this statute states that 
such benefits may be received but shall not exceed "...in any case 312 
weeks/ which shall be considered the period of compensation for permanent 
total loss of bodily function." 
The findings of the Industrial Commission indicate that the applicant 
has suffered a period of temporary total disability from the date of his 
injury on October 9/ 1980/ until May 15/ 1985/ the day applicant was able 
to return to work. Further/ the medical records and medical evidence 
indicate that applicant has suffered permanent partial disability/ and 
that his disability rating is a 79% permanent partial impairment. 
Clearly/ applicant has suffered injury and losses in two categories/ one 
being temporary total disability and the other being permanent partial 
disability. 
The Utah Code distinguishes clearly between temporary total 
disability and permanent partial disability. Section 35-1-65 provides for 
a rate of compensation and a period of compensation for temporary total 
disability- Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-66 provides for a rate of 
compensation and a period of compensation for permanent partial 
disability. Section 35-1-65 provides that the maximum term of 
compensation for temporary disability is 312 weeks. Section 35-1-66 
provides that the maximum term of compensation for temporary total 
disability is 312 weeks. These two statutory provisions should be read 
independently/ and should be read as providing for separate periods of 
compensation for separate classifications of loss or injury. Hence/ 
applicant would be entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits 
commencing September 19/ 1985 and continuing through May 15/ 1985. After 
May 15/ 1985/ he would be entitled to receive temporary total disability 
at the statutory rate/ based upon his terrporary total disability rating of 
79% permanent partial impairment/ and he would be entitled to receive such 
temporary total disability benefits for a maximum period of 312 weeks 
commencing May 15/ 1985. 
The Administrative Law Judge in entering the order of December 18/ 
1985 has relied on Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 (1985 as amended) 
for the proposition that the maximum period of compensation to which 
applicant is entitled is 312 weeks. First/ this section applies only to 
circumstances in which an injured worker is permanently and totally 
disabled. Clearly/ this does not apply to applicant in the instant case. 
For this reason/ applicant benefits should be computed under Sections 
35-1-65 and 35-1-66/ and not under the statutory provision dealing with 
permanent total disability. Further/ to the extent that the last 
paragraph of Section 35-1-67 is applicable to claimant's case/ it is in 
direct contradiction with the provisions of Section 35-1-65 and 35-1-66. 
Where such a conflict exists/ the remedial purposes of the Worker's 
Compensation^ laws should govern/ and an applicant who has suffered these 
severe injuries sustained by claimant herein should be deemed entitled 
to compensation as he has requested. 
DATED this .cffi day of December, 1985. 
CORPORON Sc WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Applicant 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY of the foregoing was 
mailed/ postage pre-paid in the United States mail to: Harsco/Heckett/ 
P.O. Box 5/ Provo/ Utah 84601; Colleen Richardson of INA Aetna/ 455 East 
South Temple/ Salt Lake City/ Utah 84110; Robert J. Shaughnessy/ Attorney 
at Law, 543 East 500 South #3, Salt Lake City/ Utah 84102, this S O day 
of December/ 1985. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000816 
KENNETH JOHNSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
HARSCO/HECKETT and/or 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA/AETNA, 
Defendants. 
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DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about December 18, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about December 31, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant by and through his attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of December 18, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
iphen M. Had ley Steph  . 
Chairman 
uic&^' ,j, tffyLfy*^ 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
7? 
Coitmussipp/Secretary 
Lenice1 L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January J?tfj^~% 1986, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Kenneth Johnson, issued 
January .£/'•**• 1986, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Kenneth Johnson, 1709 West 120 South, Provo, UT 84601 
--Mary C. Corporon, Atty., 1100 Boston Bldg., 9 Exchange Place, 
SLC, UT 84111 
Harsco/Heckett, P 0. Box 5, Provo, UT 84601 
INA/Aetna, Attn: Colleen Richardson, P. 0. Box 390, SLC, UT 
84110 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 Souths #3, SLC, UT 
84102 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
°t/ By . ^^V^^__^ 
Wilma 
